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Abstract
We introduce incomplete information to a multiparty election under propor-
tional representation: each voter knows her preferences and votes strategically to
maximize her payoffs, but is uncertain about the number and the preferences of
the other voters. Parties are assumed to be purely office motivated and, hence, the
resulting governments are always minimum winning. In this framework we prove a)
generic existence of equilibria where only two parties receive a positive fraction of
the votes and therefore lead to single-party governments and b) generic inexistence
of equilibria that lead to coalition governments. That is, contrary to common wis-
dom, a proportional rule is found not to promote sincere voting and to be favorable
towards single-party governments. The existence of two-party equilibria that lead
to single-party governments is robust to parties having ideological concerns.
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In his seminal work, Duverger (1954) formulated the following sociological laws: (1) a
majority vote on one ballot is conducive to a two-party system, known as Duverger’s
law (Duverger, 1954, p. 217), (2) proportional representation (PR) is conducive to a
multiparty system, known as Duverger’s hypothesis (Duverger, 1954, p. 239). Despite
the formal theoretical confirmation of Duverger’s law by a class of models of incomplete
information analyzing first-past-the-post (FPTP) elections (Fey, 1997; Myerson and We-
ber, 1993; Palfrey, 1989), there is no consensus on the theoretical validity of Duverger’s
hypothesis. In PR elections, a variety of spatial models sharing in common the fea-
ture of complete information provide contradicting results. While for example a class of
very insightful but also very heterogeneous approaches prove the viability of many parties
(Iaryczower and Mattozzi, 2013; Morelli, 2004; Baron and Diermeier, 2001; Austen-Smith
and Banks, 1988),1 another strand of the literature concludes that PR elections are favor-
able to two-party systems (De Sinopoli and Iannantuoni, 2007; Gerber and Ortun˜o-Ort´ın,
1998).2
The cardinality of the set of viable parties is very important as it closely relates to
the nature of the formed governments under a PR rule: two-party systems lead to single-
party governments while multi-party systems more often lead to coalition governments.
In this paper, and given that in large elections the exact number of parties’ supporters
may not be commonly known, we introduce incomplete information in PR elections and
1While for example, Baron and Diermeier (2001); Austen-Smith and Banks (1988) focus on some
bargaining process where further assumptions regarding the coalition formation process are necessary,
Iaryczower and Mattozzi (2013) assume that each party forms a single-party government with a proba-
bility equal to its vote share.
2In a unidimensional policy space and under complete information voters strategically vote only for
the two extreme parties. Centrist voters strategically vote only for the extreme parties since such strategic
vote moves the implemented policy closer to their ideal point than a sincere vote for a centrist party.
The main reason behind such strategic action is that implemented policies are a linear combination
of the policies announced by the parties, weighted by parties’ vote shares. With a similar argument
De Sinopoli and Iannantuoni (2008) show that only extreme parties (but maybe more than two) obtain
a positive vote share. Matakos et al. (2013) incorporate in such model different levels of the electoral
rule disproportionality and show how it affects the number of competing parties. For two-party systems
under alternative voting procedures such as the Borda count and approval voting see Dellis (2013); Dellis
et al. (2011).
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we show a) generic existence of equilibria where only two parties receive votes and hence
lead to single-party governments3 - and b) generic inexistence of equilibria which lead to
coalition governments. That is, contrary to common belief, we argue that PR does not
generically promote sincere voting nor is it favorable towards coalition governments.
Our modeling approach is in the framework of Bouton (2013); Fey (1997); Myerson
and Weber (1993); Palfrey (1989). We consider a two stage game: in stage one, a multi-
party election takes place under proportional representation and parties’ vote shares are
revealed. In stage two a government is formed. Borrowing the definitions of Le Breton
et al. (2008) we require that the formed government is a) winning (the government is
supported by a majority in the parliament), b) stable (there is no other winning coalition
such that all parties that would participate in would be better off), and c) vote-share
consistent (each coalition partner obtains office rents and influences the policy propor-
tionally to its vote-share contribution). These three intuitive conditions broadly describe
how proportional systems function. Proportional representation goes hand in hand with
parliamentarism, and governments are, with few exceptions, supported by a majority of
the parliament.4 Governments are by definition stable (at least for a brief period of time
that follows their formation), while the distribution of power and influence among the
coalition partners is consistent with their vote shares.5
The formed government in stage two depends on parties’ preferences: in our bench-
mark model parties are purely office motivated and care only about the share of govern-
ment portfolios they control. In such an environment, if no party can form a single-party
3Even though two-party equilibria in PR elections may seem surprising at a first glance, historically,
two-party systems contradicting Duverger’s hypothesis were established in Germany, Austria, Ireland,
and Australia (Lijphart, 1994; Riker, 1982). Currently, Malta provides an example of a two-party system
in PR elections.
4Exceptions of countries traditionally governed by minority governments are Denmark and Norway.
For a formal analysis of the emergence of minority governments see Kalandrakis (2015); Diermeier and
Merlo (2000); Laver and Shepsle (1990); Austen-Smith and Banks (1990).
5We explicitly require that Gamson’s Law holds in our setup. Gamson (1961) claimed that each
party belonging to a coalition government obtains a share of portfolios proportional to the seats that
each partner contributed to the coalition. This law has some empirical support (Warwick and Druckman,
2001; Browne and Franklin, 1973) and as Laver (1998) claims Gamson’s law is associated with “one of
the highest non-trivial R-squared figures in political science”. For recent theoretical advances see for
example Le Breton et al. (2008); Carroll and Cox (2007); Fre´chette et al. (2005).
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government then the formed coalition government is minimal winning. As we show in
section 3, non-minimal winning governments may be formed when we allow parties to
also have policy motives - modeled by preferences on coalition partners.
In stage one, voters strategically vote for one of the parties maximizing their expected
utility once the government is formed. Since we analyze PR elections, on one hand, one’s
vote may increase a party’s weight in the formed coalition. On the other hand, a single
vote may be pivotal in more than one dimensions: it may create or deter a single-party
government, but it may also determine the coalition partners. Hence, under a PR rule
the set of eventualities where one vote may affect the outcome of an election is larger
than under a FPTP rule. That makes the analysis of strategic voting under PR systems
not only interesting but also hard in terms of identifying all possible equilibria of the
game.
We obtain most of our results in the context of purely office motivated parties. We first
show the generic existence of two-party equilibria that lead to single-party governments.
Such result is in line with the theoretical predictions regarding both FPTP (Fey, 1997;
Palfrey, 1989) and two-round runoff systems (Bouton and Gratton, 2015; Bouton, 2013;
Cox, 1997). We then obtain a uniqueness result regarding the type of formed governments
by showing that when parties are office motivated only single-party governments are
formed. Among others, this result allows us to argue that sincere voting is not a generic
equilibrium of the game. Finally, we extend our model and show that the generic existence
of two-party equilibria is robust to parties exhibiting any, possibly heterogenous, degree
of mixture between office and ideology motivation.
In contrast to earlier papers supporting the existence of two-party equilibria, we as-
sume that voters’ utility depends on the formed government rather than on the electoral
outcome. We further differ from these approaches by assuming that a voter never receives
high utility when a coalition government is formed by parties she ranks low in her prefer-
ences. In particular, we assume that a voter can never be indifferent between a coalition
government formed by her two least preferred parties and a single party government by
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her favorite party. Given that this assumption cuts the described channel of flows of
votes from the “centrist” party to the extreme ones (see footnote 3), it promotes sincere
voting, and thus works against two-party equilibria. Hence, our results further reinforce
the relevance of the demonstrated two-party equilibria in PR elections (De Sinopoli and
Iannantuoni, 2007; Gerber and Ortun˜o-Ort´ın, 1998). Another assumption selected in
a way that works against two-party equilibria is the absence of a minimum vote-share
threshold requirement for a party’s representation in the parliament. A single vote may
be enough for a party to obtain representation in the parliament and possibly become
part of a coalition government. In that sense, we do not eliminate voters’ incentives to
cast a vote for a party that is expected to receive very few or even no votes.
When it comes to population uncertainty typically such assumption is made for techni-
cal reasons and tractability of the analysis while the main results hold for a deterministic
number of voters (see for example Bouton 2013; Bouton and Castanheira 2012; McLennan
2011). In our model, population uncertainty has substantial implications and the exis-
tence of two-party equilibria in PR elections. If the number of voters were deterministic
then two-party equilibria would exist conditional on the number of voters being even. Our
general result thus crucially depends on one specific dimension of population uncertainty;
on the uncertain parity of the cardinality of the set of voters. Given that such uncertainty
is perfectly natural in large elections, where PR systems are employed, our results are of
independent interest as far as the application of Poisson games in concerned.
In section 2, we present our benchmark model of purely office motivated parties and
present most of our results. In section 3 we extend our model and show that our two-
party equilibria existence result holds even if parties have some ideological concerns. In
section 4 we conclude. All proofs can be found in the Appendix.
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2 The Benchmark Model
We model PR elections as a two stage game. In the first stage, k voters vote for one of
the three office motivated parties A, B, and C (our main results extend to any number of
parties). In the second stage, and once parties’ number of votes are revealed (VA, VB, VC)
a single-party or coalition government is formed. After stage two, parties’ and voters’
payoffs are realized.
We assume that the number of voters is a Poisson random variable k with mean n.
We focus on large elections, that is when n is large.6 Formally,
k ∼ P (n)⇐⇒ Pr(k = m) = e−n nm
m!
Each voter has a strict preference ranking over the three parties that depends on her
type. There are six types of voters denoted by t ∈ T = {tABC , tACB, tBAC , tBCA, tCAB, tCBA}.
A tABC type denotes a voter who has a strict preference ordering for A over B, and for
B over C. The six types of voters exhaust the possible strict preference rankings over
the three parties. Each voter is assigned a type t by i.i.d. draws. The probability that a
randomly drawn voter is assigned type t is p(t), with
∑
t∈T p(t) = 1 and p(t) > 0 for all
t ∈ T . These probabilities are common knowledge.
We assume that there is a continuum of offices and that a government is a distribution
of these offices among coalition partners that satisfies Gamson’s law. Hence, each coalition
partner’s weight in the government is proportional to its vote share contribution (we call
these governments vote-share consistent). To make notation simpler we henceforth denote
by
G ∈ G = {{A}, {B}, {C}, {A,B}, {A,C}, {B,C}, {A,B,C}}
any vote-share consistent government. Formally party J ∈ {A,B,C} is represented in
government G with weight WGJ =
VJ∑
Q∈G VQ
if J ∈ G and WGJ = 0 if J /∈ G. Hence, WGJ
6In the proofs we use the assumption that n → ∞ to simplify math. All the results still hold if we
substitute “n→∞” with “n sufficiently large”.
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is simply the share of offices controlled by party J in a vote-share consistent government
G.





Without loss of generality the values of ut(J) are normalized so that a t-type voter obtains
utility ut(J) = 1 for J being her first ranked party, ut(J) = 0 for J being her second
ranked party, and ut(J) = −1 for party J being her third ranked party. Therefore, if party
J forms a single-party government then a t-type voter obtains utility Ut(J) = ut(J). If
a coalition government is formed then voters’ utility depends on parties’ relative weights
in the coalition and the valuation that voters assign to each coalition partner.
Example 1. Since formed governments are vote-share consistent the relative weights
of parties A and B in a G = {A,B} government are W {A,B}A = VA/(VA + VB) and
W
{A,B}




Once the government is formed a t-type voter obtains utility







Having assumed that ut(J) = 1 for J being a t-type’s first ranked party, ut(J) = 0 for J
being her second ranked party, and ut(J) = −1 for party J being her third ranked party,
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Naturally, it holds that UtABC ({A,B}) > UtACB({A,B}).
Here it is important to mention that a) our assumptions regarding the numerical values
of ut(J) are not important regarding our main results (single party governments, non-
sincere voting equilibrium and the existence of two party equilibria), and b) our results
still hold for any smooth monotonic transformation of the WGJ ’s. Clearly if one were to
characterize all possible equilibria of the game then varying the valuations could affect
the exact equilibrium strategy profile. Nevertheless since a complete characterization
is impossible in this setup the chosen values of ut(J) are a technical simplification in
our effort to reveal important characteristics of the equilibrium outcomes. One could
alternatively assume that voters derive different utility levels from their first, second and
third ranked alternatives but this would imply a significant cost in terms of notation
and readability without enhancing our results in any direction. The irrelevance of these
assumptions will be evident in the discussion and formal proofs of our main results.
In our benchmark model parties are purely office motivated and aim at maximizing
their weight in the government irrespectively of the identity of their coalition partners.




In order for a government to be formed we require that the latter is winning and
stable. If more than one government is winning and stable then we assume that they are
formed with equal probability.






(VA + VB + VC).






(VA + VB + VC) and UJ(G
′) > UJ(G) for every J ∈ G′.
Going back to the first stage of the game we define voters’ strategies. Strategies
are defined for types and not for individuals. Let σJ(t) denote the probability that a
t-type voter votes for party J . The strategy of t-type voters is respectively defined as
the vector σ(t) = (σA(t), σB(t), σC(t)). A strategy profile is denoted by σ = (σ(tABC),
σ(tACB), σ(tBAC), σ(tBCA), σ(tCAB), σ(tCBA)). The number of votes that party J receives
is a Poisson random variable with parameter vJn (which coincides with the expected
number of votes of party J) where vJ =
∑
t∈T σJ(t)p(t).
Parties’ behavior in the second stage is unambiguous and the formed government is
perfectly predictable. We therefore define an equilibrium of the game only in terms of
voters’ strategies in the first stage. Given the incomplete information setup regarding
voters’ types we consider Bayesian Nash Equilibria (BNE) in pure strategies.
2.1 Results
Given that parties are purely office motivated their behavior in the second stage is un-
ambiguous and described by the following lemma:
Lemma 1. If a party obtains the majority of the votes then it forms a single-party
government. If no party obtains the majority of the votes and since all parties are purely
office motivated then only the minimal winning coalition is a winning, stable, and vote-
share consistent government.
(All proofs can be found in the Appendix.)
If parties are purely office motivated and no party obtains a majority of votes, then
parties form a minimal winning coalition letting aside the party that received the most
votes (Riker, 1962). Under vote-share consistency, a minimal winning coalition guarantees
the maximal weight for both coalition partners among all possible coalition governments
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and hence qualifies the stability requirement. If any of the two partners were to form
a coalition with the excluded party this would result into lower weight in the formed
government, and hence lower payoffs.
We are now ready to prove that proportional elections may be conducive to a two-
party system. This result is in line with the strand of the literature where in PR systems
only two parties obtain votes in equilibrium (De Sinopoli and Iannantuoni, 2007; Gerber
and Ortun˜o-Ort´ın, 1998) and sustains the well documented two-party equilibria of FPTP
(Fey, 1997; Palfrey, 1989) and two-round runoff systems (Bouton and Gratton, 2015;
Bouton, 2013). To understand our result from a comparative perspective, let us comment
on the different events that voters may be pivotal under alternative electoral rules.
In FPTP elections, the unique case in which a voter may be pivotal is to break (or
create) a tie in favor of the winner of the election. Performing a strategic calculation,
a strategic voter casts a vote based on the highest pivotal probability, so that her vote
possibly determines the winner of the election. Since the highest pivotal probability is
associated with the probability that any of the two “large” parties wins, any voter who
is ideologically close to a third small party strategically votes the best of the two “large”
parties, rather than wasting her vote by supporting her favorite losing party. With a
relatively similar argument, two-round runoff elections may give rise to a hunt of a first
round victory that also produces multiple two-party equilibria.7
Conversely, in PR elections, strategic incentives are present for a strategic voter not to
abandon her favorite “small” party. In our setup a single vote guarantees representation
in the parliament and thus the possibility that one’s favorite party participates in the
minimal winning coalition. The class of pivotal events is therefore richer in PR elections
than in FPTP elections. First, and similar to FPTP elections, a voter may give one
necessary vote to a party so that it forms a single-party government. Second, and in
contrast to FPTP elections, a voter may give one extra (or one less) vote to one party so
7Notice that runoff elections may sustain sincere voting and hence a multiparty equilibrium (Bouton,
2013).
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that she strategically affects a) the set of coalition partners and b) the weights of coalition
partners.
Taking the above elements into consideration, voters in the first stage vote for the
party that maximizes their expected utility. Given that voters know that parties are
purely office motivate they can predict the possible (minimal winning coalition) govern-
ment formed in stage two as a function of parties’ vote shares.
Proposition 1. (Existence of two-party equilibria) In large elections a two-party pure
strategy equilibrium always exist.
In order to illustrate the intuition behind this result consider the strategic consider-
ations of a tABC voter (A  B  C) forming expectations that her favorite party A will
not obtain any vote. Such strategic voter may be pivotal in the following three events: i)
party B has one vote less than party C, ii) parties B and C tie, or iii) party B has one
vote more than party C. Hence, this voter may create or break a tie between party B
and C, and possibly determine the minimal winning coalition including her favorite party
A. First, notice that in these three pivotal events a vote for party C is dominated by a
vote for party B. Hence, given such expectations a vote for party C consists a dominated
strategy.8 In order to analyze the decision of such voter between a vote for party A or
party B we summarize the three pivotal events in Table 1.
8Under PR elections, and in contrast to FPTP elections, a vote for the last ranked party may not
always consist a dominated strategy.
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Formed coalition, valuations and expected utility if she votes:
Pivotal Event A B




VˆB = 1 {A,C}(−1/3), {B,C}(−2/3), [−1/2] {B,C}(−1/2), [−1/2]
VˆB = 0 {A,C}(0), [0] {B,C}(-1/2), [-1/2]






VˆB = VˆC = 1 {A,B}(1/2), {A,C}(0), {B,C}(−1/2), [0] {B}(0), [0]
VˆB = VˆC = 0 A(1), [1] {B}(0), [0]




VˆC = 1 {A,B}(1/3), {B,C}(−1/3), [0] {B}(0), [0]
VˆC = 0 {A,B}(1/2), [1/2] {B}(0), [0]
Table 1: Strategic considerations of a tABC voter. VˆJ denotes the number of votes
that party J receives by the rest of the population (i.e. by everybody except this voter). Governments
appear in curly brackets, their valuations in parentheses and expected utilities in brackets.
In all pivotal events a vote for B leads to a predictable government. If B had one
vote less than C now the two parties tie and have to form a coalition government with
equal weights. If the two parties were tying or when B had one vote more than C then
a vote for B allows the latter form a single-party government. A vote for A leads to a
predictable government when at least one of B and C parties is expected not to obtain
any votes (VˆB = 0, VˆC = 0, or both) or when both parties receive votes by more than
one voters and they do not tie (VˆB = VˆC − 1 and VˆB > 1 or VˆB = VˆC + 1 and VˆC > 1).
In the remaining situations where all parties receive votes and after the voter’s support
for A at least two parties tie more than one minimal winning coalitions exist with one of
them being randomly formed.
Let us first focus on “small” elections. If the tABC voter is the only voter participating
in the election (i.e. VˆB = VˆC = 0) or there is at most one other voter (VˆB = VˆC − 1 and
VˆB = 0 or VˆB = VˆC + 1 and VˆC = 0) then in all three pivotal events she is strictly better
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off voting her favorite party A rather than her second ranked party B. When both parties
B and C receive votes and at least one of them has exactly one vote, a tABC voter is
indifferent between supporting A or B for all such three pivotal events.
In “large” enough elections (VˆB > 1 and VˆC > 1) it turns out that the voter is
better off supporting her second ranked party B. In such elections, and for all three
pivotal events, a single vote for her favorite party A guarantees its representation in the
minimal winning coalition. In such coalition A’s actual weight depends on the number
of voters participating in the election supporting its coalition partner. In general, if the
number of voters participating in the election is large enough an {A,B} (or {A,C})
government where A is supported by only one voter is almost identical to a {B} (or
{C}) single-party government given the minimal weight of A. Because of this, a tABC
voter is willing to abandon her favorite party A that has almost zero influence in an
{A,C} government in the search for a balanced {B,C} government as presented in the
first pivotal event (VˆB = VˆC − 1 > 1) and is indifferent between a single-party {B}
government and an {A,B} coalition as presented in the third pivotal event. Similarly,
a single-party government by B as presented in the second pivotal event (VˆB = VˆC) is
strictly preferred to an {A,C} government and indifferent to an {A,B} government (so
is the case in the third pivotal event where VˆB = VˆC + 1 and VˆC > 1).
Notice now that all three pivotal events in large elections are practically equiprobable
(Myerson, 2000). In the first and second events the utility difference by voting B rather
than A is positive and non-degenerate while in the third event the utility difference is
negative and converges to zero when n → +∞. Hence conditional on the expected
number of voters being large a tABC voter strategically votes for party B. Similarly, we
can argue that if a tACB voter expects that party A will not receive any other votes she
also abandons the latter and votes for party C. As a consequence, in equilibrium, only
parties B and C receive votes giving rise to a two-party equilibrium.9
9Notice that while the calculated expected utilities clearly depend on the numerical values assumed
for the valuations voters attach to parties the argument is generalizable and rather depends on the pivotal
probabilities.
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Are these two-party equilibria the unique equilibria of the game? Unfortunately the
complexity of the analyzed environment does not permit a complete characterization of
all equilibria. Nevertheless we can obtain a uniqueness result pointing at the type of
formed governments under PR elections.
Proposition 2. (single-party government) In large elections and if parties are purely
office motivated only single-party governments may be formed in a pure strategy equilib-
rium.
We will provide the intuition by contradicting an equilibrium leading to a coalition
government. By lemma 1 a coalition is formed when no party has a majority of the
vote. Given that we focus on pure strategies it also holds that, generically, no ties among
parties are sustained in equilibrium and no party can obtain exactly half of the votes. So
as to demonstrate the intuition of our result, let without loss of generality the beliefs that
are part of such a BNE be consistent with C being the party that obtains the most votes,
followed by B and A respectively (i.e. 0 < vA < vB < vC < 1/2). Given parties’ office
motives the minimal winning coalition {A,B} is expected to be formed. Now consider
the strategic incentives of a voter that ranks party C above the two others. Her vote
may increase the weight of a party in the coalition government and it may determine
the coalition government that will be formed. The probability of the last event coincides
with the probability that her vote determines the winner of the election and converges
to the probability of two independent draws from distinct Poisson distributions taking
the same value. Comparing the expected gain of a voter from voting the party she
prefers between A and B (by increasing its weight in the coalition government) with the
probability that her vote is pivotal in determining the coalition composition it turns out
that the former tends to be infinitely larger compared to the latter. Hence this voter and
all others ranking C first have incentives to abandon their favorite party C providing a
contradiction of such profile being a BNE.
This line of reasoning also establishes that when no party is ranked first by an absolute
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majority, then sincere voting cannot be an equilibrium of the game. This is straightfor-
wardly so because for such generic distributions of voters’ types sincere voting would lead
to a coalition government and, as the above proposition dictates, there are no such equi-
libria under a PR rule. This reading of our results directly opposes the conventional belief
that PR systems provide incentives to the voters to truthfully reveal their preferences.
This second proposition essentially provides a generic characterization of the whole
set of pure strategy equilibria while the first proposition guarantees that this set is never
empty. Hence, our analysis has so far established a) that there always exists a single-party
government equilibrium and it is such that only two parties receive votes (Proposition 1)
and b) that single-party government equilibria are generically the unique pure strategy
equilibria of the game (Proposition 2). But can there exist a single-party government
equilibrium, pure or mixed, such that all three parties receive votes?10 Are there mixed
equilibria which lead to coalition governments? The first class of equilibria cannot be
ruled out, but even if they exist, they are of the same kind as the generic two-party
equilibria that we identified (single-party governments are formed). The second class of
equilibria, though, can fortunately be ruled out following similar arguments as in the
proof of Proposition 2. If the beliefs that are part of such a mixed BNE are consistent
with a coalition government, say {A,B}, being formed with a probability that converges
to one (i.e. 0 < vA ≤ vB < vC < 1/2 or 0 < vB < vA < vC < 1/2),11 then a voter
that ranks party C above the two others will face the same dilemmas as detailed in the
paragraph below Proposition 2 and will prefer to vote for the coalition partner she likes
most (either A or B) rather than stick with her most preferred alternative, C. This shows
that such beliefs cannot be part of a BNE. Similarly, beliefs that are consistent with a
10Notice that not in all cases where all three parties receive votes a coalition government has to be
formed. For example, let party C be expected to secure an absolute majority and hence form a single-
party government. Obviously, in this case the reasoning described before does not apply: Types of voters
ranking party C first do not expect an {A,B} government and hence need not consider that voting for
C is a lost vote.
11Despite the fact that mixed equilibria with vC =
1
2 cannot be ruled out, their possible existence
should crucially depend both on distributional assumptions and, perhaps more importantly, on the
assumptions regarding voters’ exact cardinal preferences. That is, even if they exist they may in no way
represent a robust prediction of the model.
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coalition government, say {A,B} or {A,C}, each being formed with a probability that
converges to one half (i.e. 0 < vA < vB = vC < 1/2), can not be part of a BNE either.
In this instance, all voters prefer to vote either for B or for C so as to determine the
minimal winning coalition and nobody wants to vote for A (a voter votes for B if she likes
C more than B so as to induce VC < VB and hence a minimal winning {A,C} government,
similarly a voter votes for C if she likes B more than C).12 Overall, inexistence of such
equilibria makes the model give a very clear prediction: proportional representation is
favorable to single-party governments.
3 Policy Motives
Aiming our analysis to be as general as possible, we now allow parties to be both office and
ideology motivated. Parties not only aim at participating and maximizing their weight
in the government (office dimension), but also care for the ideological proximity of their
coalition partner (ideology dimension). Notice that for each party there exist two voter
types who rank the latter first. For party A for example these are the tABC and tACB
types. With no need to explicitly define the preference ordering over coalition partners,
we assume that each party’s J preference ordering aligns with the preference ranking of
one of these two types.
Formally, let PJ denote the preference ordering of party J that coincides with that of
type t. Given any government G party J obtains payoffs
UJ(G) = λJW
G
J + (1− λJ)Ut(G)
12The change in the weights of the coalition partners that one can induce by one’s vote is bounded
from above by 1(k+1)/2 =
2
k+1 (when k other voters participate then a coalition government has to receive
at least (k + 1)/2 votes). Hence, the expected change in a coalition’s weights when voting for A is
strictly smaller than E( 2k+1 ) = 2
en−1

























= 0. That is, the probability that one’s vote is decisive in the choice of A’s
coalition partner becomes infinitely larger than the expected utility gain from increasing the weight of
one’s prefered party in a given coalition when the electorate becomes arbitrarily large.
16
where λJ ∈ [0, 1].
On the one hand, parties care for office (with relevant importance λJ), and hence
prefer to form a coalition with a weak partner in terms of vote share, so that they have a
high weight in the coalition (WGJ ). On the other hand, parties care for the ideology of the
government (with relevant importance 1 − λJ), and hence wish to form coalitions with
ideologically close partners. Observe that i) parties may have different λ’s and ii) that
the two extreme cases of purely office motivated (λJ = 1) and purely policy motivated
parties (λJ = 0) are incorporated in our analysis.
Regarding the second stage of the game we assume that a known to the voters Govern-
ment Formation Process (GFP) takes place. Most papers studying proportional repre-
sentation describe such process into detail (see for example Seidmann et al. 2007; Austen-
Smith and Banks 1988). We refrain from doing so in order to guarantee the highest pos-
sible degree of generality. Given the electoral outcome {VA, VB, VC}, parties’ ideological
and office-holding orientation {λA, λB, λC}, and parties’ preference profile {PA, PB, PC}
we allow any GFP that provides a government G that is vote-share consistent, winning,
and stable (if meaningful).
A winning and vote-share consistent coalition government always exists for any pos-
sible electoral outcome and model parameters. If one party obtains more than half of
the votes then it is straightforward that a single-party government is winning, and is by
definition vote-share consistent since the winner of the election enjoys all rents. If no
party obtains the majority of the votes then any two-party coalition is winning. Vote-
share consistency can always be satisfied by splitting benefits proportionally to coalition
partners’ vote-share contributions. Hence there always exists at least one winning and
vote-share consistent government.
Although a single-party government is always stable notice that if no party obtains
the majority of the votes then a two-party stable government may not always exist (this
is why we require a stable government only when meaningful). If for example party A
prefers to form a coalition with B rather than C, and B prefers to form a coalition with A
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rather than C, then the coalition government {A,B} is formed and is stable. Conversely,
in case of non-mutual agreements that may for example stem from a cycle in terms of
preference orderings for coalition partners the notion of stability does not apply. For
example, if party A prefers as a partner B to C, B prefers as a partner C to A, and C
prefers as a partner B to A the stability condition need not be satisfied. In such cases
we require that the GFP provides only a winning and vote-share consistent government
according to some (undefined) rule known to the voters without imposing any further
restrictions.13
Similarly, if more than one stable and winning coalition exist we assume that from
the voters’ point of view the selection of the coalition government by the GFP follows a
stochastic process. That is, voters know that each stable and winning coalition is selected
as the government coalition with some non-degenerate positive probability.14 As it will be
clear, the above inexplicit characterization of the GFP by two (or three) broad properties
is enough to guarantee the existence of two-party equilibria. Henceforth, it is important
to bear in mind that our GFP is a general government formation process known to the
voters, and guarantees that for every electoral outcome a government is formed.
3.1 Two-party Equilibria
Although the main result of this section is related to our previous arguments some further
lemmas are necessary.
Lemma 2. For all values of λJ ∈ [0, 1], if party J obtains the majority of the votes then
it forms a single-party government. If not all parties are purely office motivated then the
government coalition may be non-minimal.
13The description of how a government is formed when no stable coalitions exist is presented here only
for completeness. Such description is irrelevant regarding our results since in all cases of interest there
always exists at least one stable coalition.
14The probability with which the coalition government is selected out of a set a stable winning coalitions
should obviously depend on parties’ exact vote shares, on their ideology-office holding orientation and on
their policy preferences. Since for our analysis an explicit formal structure of all the above is redundant,
we refrain from formally defining properties of this probability. The only assumption we impose is that
whenever the set of stable winning coalitions includes more than one element, then a non-degenerate
positive probability is assigned to each of these elements.
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The first part of this result is straightforward and is implied by the definition of
parties’ preferences and the assumed GFP. A single-party government guarantees all
office and ideology rents for the winner of the election. Hence, a single-party government
is the unique government that is winning, stable and vote-share consistent when a party
obtains the majority of the votes.
In contrast to the case of purely office motivated parties a minimal winning coalition
may not be stable when parties care for the ideological proximity of their coalition partners
(Axelrod, 1970; De Swan, 1973). One of the two partners in the minimal winning coalition
may be disposed to renounce some weight in the coalition (some office rents) in order
to participate in a government with an ideologically close partner. The amount of office
rents party J is willing to give away in order to collaborate with an ideologically close
coalition partner depends on the relative importance parties attach to their office versus
ideology motives (parameter λJ). Intuitively, the more ideology motivated parties are
(small values of λA, λB and λC), the higher is the probability that the winning coalition
is non-minimal.
To illustrate the formal proof of the above result consider for example three parties
competing in a large election obtaining approximately the same amount of votes. Let in
particular one party receive one and two more votes than its two competitors respectively.
If all parties are purely office motivated, then clearly the two parties that received the
least votes form a minimal winning coalition. If parties are not purely office motivated,
a minimal winning coalition may not be stable any longer. The party that received the
second largest vote share may have incentives to form a coalition with the party that
received the most votes if the latter is closer to its ideology than the party that received
the least votes. In other words, the party that received the second largest vote share
may opt for less weight in a coalition with an ideologically close partner rather than
more weight in the minimal winning coalition. Next we show that these forces have their
limitations: when two parties are equally large and the third one is tiny, then both office
and policy motives make this third party be an attractive coalition partner.
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Lemma 3. Let the level of participation in the election be sufficiently high (k > 7). If
the votes for the two parties that receive the most votes differ by at most one vote and
the third party receives a single vote, then the latter is a member of at least one winning,
vote-share consistent, and stable coalition.
The above lemma provides a sufficient condition (k > 7) for the existence of a winning,
vote-share consistent, and stable government in which a party that obtains a single vote
participates.15 Since the latter is not powerful in terms of vote share, both other parties
prefer it as a coalition partner to the other strong party no matter how close it is to them
ideologically. Moreover, when the two parties that receive the most votes tie, the party
that receives a single vote determines the coalition government by choosing its coalition
partner.
Building on the previous preliminary results, we can now show that proportional
elections may be conducive to a two-party system even if parties have some ideological
concerns. Remember that when voters calculate their expected utility they are aware of
the GFP and can predict the possible coalition governments formed in stage two as a
function of the electoral outcome.
Proposition 3. (Existence of two-party equilibria) In large elections and for all values
of λA, λB, λC ∈ [0, 1] two-party equilibria exist.
In order to illustrate the intuition of this result we follow similar arguments as in
Proposition 1. Let us assume, without loss of generality, that party’s A preferences
coincide with those of a tABC type (A prefers as a coalition partner party B to party C).
As before consider the strategic considerations of a tABC voter who forms expectations
that party A will not obtain any vote, while the two other parties are expected to obtain
a positive number of votes. Remember that the events in which this voter may be pivotal
15Given the numerical values we have attached to the valuations ut(J) the condition of Lemma 3 is
satisfied if more than seven voters participate in the election (k > 7). This numerical condition would
vary for different values of ut(J). However, different thresholds for k do not affect the intuition and
results of neither Lemma 3 nor of the following proposition.
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are the same as when parties are purely office motivated (parties B and C tie, or when one
of the two parties has an advantage of one vote) and that a vote for party C is dominated
by a vote for party B. We summarize the pivotal events, whether the condition of Lemma
3 is satisfied or not, and the sign of the corresponding utility difference from a vote for
her second ranked party B rather than her first ranked party A in the following table.
Pivotal Event k > 7 Utility from a vote for B
minus utility from a vote for A.
VˆB = VˆC − 1 Yes +
No + / −
VˆB = VˆC Yes −
No + / −
VˆB = VˆC + 1 Yes −
No + / −
Table 1: Strategic considerations of a tABC voter. VˆJ denotes the number of votes
that party J receives by the rest of the population (i.e. by everybody except this voter).
The crucial and only pivotal event in which the utility from voting party B is guaran-
teed to be larger than the utility from voting party A is when party B is expected to have
one vote less than party C conditional on the number of voters being large (condition of
lemma 3 is satisfied). In this event, a vote for party B creates a tie between parties B
and C. Thus, a balanced {B,C} government is formed. Conversely, a vote for party A
may result either to an unbalanced {B,C} (where parties B and C have “almost” equal
weights since party B has one less vote than party C) or to an {A,C} coalition. If a
{B,C} coalition is to be formed then the voter is better off supporting party B rather
than party A since it raises B’s weight in such coalition. If an {A,C} coalition is to be
formed notice that in such coalition party C has much larger weight than party A. Given
the large number of voters, the utility from an {A,C} government where party A has
tiny weight converges to the utility from a single-party {C} government. Therefore, a
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tABC voter significantly prefers a balanced {B,C} coalition than an unbalanced {A,C}
coalition, whereas she only marginally prefers the balanced {B,C} to the unbalanced
{B,C} coalition. Since both coalitions (the balanced {B,C} or the unbalanced {A,C})
are formed with a non-degenerate probability the utility for a vote for B minus the utility
for a vote for A is positive and non-degenerate for any k > 7. Hence, conditional on the
election being large and that party B is expected to have one vote less than party C a
tABC voter is significantly better off by voting her second ranked party B than her first
ranked party A.
Remaining in large elections (k > 7), the other two pivotal events are situations in
which party B is expected to tie or to have one vote more than party C. In both events,
a vote for party B allows B to form a single-party government. Conversely, a vote for
A leads to an {A,B} government and hence larger utility for a tABC voter than a single
party {B} government. Similar to our previous argument notice that, since we refer to
large elections, the weight of party A in the {A,B} coalition is tiny, and thus the utility
difference between an {A,B} coalition or a single party {B} government converges to
zero.
Remember that all three pivotal events in large elections are practically equiprobable
(Myerson, 2000). Given that in the first event the utility difference is positive and non-
degenerate while in the two other events the utility difference is negative and converges
to zero, we conclude that conditional on the number of voters being large a tABC voter
strategically votes for party B.
Now, if only few voters participate in the election (condition of Lemma 3 is not
satisfied), in all three pivotal situations a tABC voter could be either better off or worse
off by voting her first ranked partyA compared to partyB (this would depend on the exact
values of each λJ and k). For example, given the small number of the total votes cast,
a single vote for party A could possibly translate to an important weight in the formed
government and thus strong incentives for such voter not to abandon her first ranked
party A. Nevertheless, when the voter takes into consideration the pivotal probabilities
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it turns out that the pivotal events conditional on few voters participating in the election
do not affect her decision. In particular, the following formal argument is crucial: As n
becomes large the probability that k ≤ 7 converges to zero and also becomes infinitely
smaller than the probability of the event {k > 7 and VˆB = VˆC + η where η ∈ {−1, 0, 1}}
despite the probability of the latter event also converging to zero. Therefore, the utility
differences for k ≤ 7 are insignificant as far as the voters’ decision is concerned.
Remember that conditional on the election being large (k > 7) a tABC voter strategi-
cally votes party B in the effort to create a tie between parties B and C. For the same
reasoning if a tACB voter expects that party A will not receive any other votes while
parties B and C will obtain a positive number of votes then a tACB voter abandons party
A and votes for party C. Therefore, in equilibrium, only parties B and C receive votes.
Hence, two-party equilibria exist as both types who rank party A first (tABC and tACB)
aim at creating a tie between parties B and C and thus a {B,C} government. Notice
that such tie is meaningful only if the number of voters k is even. This is possible in
our model since we assume a random number of voters. Had we assumed a deterministic
number of voters then our main result would not any longer hold if it was known that
the number of voters is odd.
Without entering into details, notice that two-party equilibria exist no matter how
many parties compete in the election. The reasoning just described remains unaffected;
if a voter expects that in equilibrium only two parties receive votes by the rest of the
voters, then in the effort to create the “desired” tie she strategically votes the party she
ranks higher between these two parties. As far as stability is concerned, notice that the
two-party equilibria that we proved to exist are pure strategy equilibria. This implies
that voters are, generically, not indifferent between two distinct available actions. Since
in Poisson games the probabilities of all relevant eventualities are continuous in parties’
expected vote shares, we must have that for any n there should exist ε˚ > 0 such that
whenever party A is expected to receive a vote share ε ∈ (0, ε˚) then all voters still strictly
prefer to vote for either B or C. That is, our equilibrium satisfies the notion of ε−stability
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used in similar models (see Bouton 2013 for a more detailed discussion of this property).
4 Concluding Remarks
We introduce incomplete information in PR elections. Given the absence of consensus
in the literature regarding the number of surviving parties, our results further suggest
that PR elections may be conducive to a two-party system. Even though the strategic
incentives in FPTP systems to ultimately vote one of the two “large” parties are un-
ambiguously more direct than in PR systems, we show that the latter may as well have
a devastating effect towards all but two parties. Hence, despite PR systems being of-
ten considered to represent voters’ preferences better than FPTP systems and promote
sincere voting our results show that if information is incomplete this is may not be true.
Since this paper consists a first attempt to analyze incomplete information in PR
elections we considered a simple and intuitive setup comparable to the ones focusing on
FPTP and two-round runoff systems (Bouton, 2013; Fey, 1997; Myerson and Weber, 1993;
Palfrey, 1989). When it comes to the details regarding PR systems, in order to obtain
robust results, we structured the model so that two-party equilibria are not promoted.
First, we did not require a minimum threshold such that a party is represented in the
parliament. Second, we assumed that for any voter a coalition government between two
low ranked parties can never be as near as good as a single-party government by her
highest ranked party.
Despite our formal analysis focusing on a three party election our results naturally
extend to a more general setup with any finite number of parties. As long as voters
have strict preferences over parties, no matter how many parties compete in the election,
two-party equilibria exist. Finally, we consider our analysis of interest regarding the
application of Poisson games. Assuming population uncertainty we provide a result of
two-party equilibria that vanishes once it is certain that the number of voters is odd.
Given that our analysis focuses in large elections, considering a random number of voters
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as introduced by Myerson (2000) seems the appropriate methodology to proceed.
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5 Appendix (Proofs)
Lemma 1 If party J obtains the majority of the vote (that is VJ >
1
2
k) then by forming
a single-party government G = J where WGJ = 1 it obtains payoff UJ(J) = 1. For any
other coalition government G 6= J then it is straightforward that UJ(G) < UJ(J) since
it holds that WGJ < 1. If no party has a majority of votes then party J maximizes its
utility by forming a coalition government with Q if and only if VQ ≤ VR.16 It is obvious
that if all parties tie then any coalition is minimum winning. If at least one party’s
number of votes is different from the ones of the other parties then a) in case all number
of votes are different the two bigger parties want to form a coalition with the smallest
one and the smallest one wants to form a coalition with the second smallest one b) if two
parties tie and receive less votes than the other party then they wish to form a coalition
with each other and c) if two parties tie and receive more votes than the other party
then both want to form a coalition with the smallest party while the smallest party is
indifferent. In all three cases only a minimal winning coalition is stable, winning and
vote-share consistent.QED
Proposition 1 A BNE consists of strategies and beliefs. We will prove that if the
expected vote share of A is zero and the expected votes shares of B and C are strictly
positive then a tABC will vote for B (equivalently one can show that a tACB voter will
vote for C). Consider the first pivotal event VˆB = VˆC − 1 as presented in Table 1,
where VˆB and VˆC denote the number of votes that B and C receive by the rest of the
population. If VˆB = 0 then the voter is strictly better off voting A. If VˆB = 1 then the
voter is indifferent between voting A and B. If VˆB > 1 then the voter is better off voting
B for a large enough number of voters. Notice that prob(VˆB = 0|VˆB = VˆC − 1) → 0,
prob(VˆB = 1|VˆB = VˆC − 1) → 0 and prob(VˆB > 1|VˆB = VˆC − 1) → 1 as n → ∞ and
that utility differences are bounded from above and below (conditional on VˆB = VˆC − 1
our voter’s choice will affect her utility by at most 1
2
independently of how many voters
vote). Therefore, conditional on VˆB = VˆC − 1 the voter decides which party to support
16Where J,Q and R are distinct elements of {A,B,C}.
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based on the most probable event in large elections (i.e. VˆB > 1) and votes B (i.e.
the expected utility difference by voting B rather than A is equal to 1
2
). Exactly the
same argument applies for the second pivotal event where VˆB = VˆC . Consider now
the third pivotal event VˆB = VˆC + 1. If VˆC = 0 then the voter is strictly better off
voting A. If VˆC = 1 then the voter is indifferent between voting A and B. If VˆB > 1
then for a large enough number of voters the voter is essentially indifferent between
voting A and B. Given the same argument regarding pivotal probabilities, conditional
on VˆB = VˆC + 1 the expected utility difference by voting B rather than A is negative but
converges to zero as n → ∞. Notice now that all three pivotal events are equiprobable
(Myerson, 2000). Given the positive and non-degenerate utility difference from the first
two events a tABC will vote for B (equivalently a tACB voter will vote for C). Hence,
beliefs {vA = 0, vB = p(tBAC) + p(tBCA) + p(tABC), vC = p(tCAB) + p(tCBA) + p(tACB)}
and the strategy profile that is consistent with these beliefs form a BNE. QED
Proposition 2 Consider that there exists a BNE that leads to a coalition government
with a non-degenerate probability. Since we focus on pure strategy equilibria, the beliefs
which are part of such a BNE should be consistent with 0 < vJ < vQ < vR < 1/2
for any generic distribution of players’ types. Let us assume without loss of generality
that 0 < vA < vB < vC < 1/2. In such case the probability with which the minimal
winning coalition {A,B} will be formed after the election converges to one as n becomes
arbitrarily large. Let us study the problem that a tCAB voter faces. Her vote may
increase the weight of a party in a coalition government (such a change in the weight
is bounded from below by 1
k+1
) or/and it may determine the coalition government that
will be formed. Conditional on the outcome being such that a vote cannot affect the
coalition government that will be formed, a tCAB voter obviously prefers to vote for party
A since the coalition government {A,B} will be formed with infinitely larger probability
than any other coalition government. Now, conditional on her vote being pivotal for the
determination of the exact coalition (or single-party) government a tCAB voter could be
better off by not voting for party A. Since parties are purely office motivated, all such
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pivotal events are a subset of the cases in which the difference between the votes of (at
least) two parties is not more than one vote plus the case in which a party lacks one vote
to form a single-party government. Moreover, the probability of any such pivotal event









(see Myerson, 2000) where (ψˆ, ωˆ) = arg min{(√ψ−√ω)2 such that ψ and ω take distinct
values from the set {vA, vB, vC , 1− vA, 1− vB, 1− vC}}.
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where Γ(z) is the Euler gamma function, Γ(a, z) is the incomplete gamma function and


















Pure office motivation and 0 < vA < vB < vC < 1/2 suggest that prob(
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− 1 > VˆC >
max{VˆA, VˆB}+1)→ 1 as n→ +∞, m being positive suggests that limn→+∞ 2Γ(1+m)Γ(1+m)−Γ(1+m,n) =
2 and (
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= 0. Hence, the required
relationship holds.
This proves that when a strategy profile generates expected vote shares 0 < vA <
vB < vC < 1/2, then a tCAB voter is strictly better off by voting for A than for C.
Similarly one can show that a tCBA voter is strictly better off by voting for B than for
C and that C is not a best response to such expectations for any voter type. That is,
beliefs which are consistent with 0 < vA < vB < vC < 1/2 cannot be part of a BNE since
they lead to VˆC = 0 and, hence, to a voting behavior which is inconsistent with them.
QED
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Lemma 2 Similar to Lemma 1 if a party J obtains the majority of the votes then
by performing a single-party government G = J where WGJ = 1 it maximizes its payoff
UJ(J) = 1. To show that under policy motives the government coalition may be non-
minimal let λA = λB = λC = λ < 1 and V˜A = V˜C + ε = V˜B + 2ε where V˜J = VJ/(VA +
VB + VC) denotes party’s J vote share. Assume that the policy preferences of party A
are compatible with those of a voter of type tABC and the policy preferences of party
B are compatible with those of a voter of type tBAC . Then due to both office seeking
incentives and ideology proximity party A strictly prefers to form a coalition with B than
with C. Now, B strictly prefers to form a coalition with A rather than with C if and
only if UB({A,B}) > UB({B,C}). The latter holds if and only if:
λ VB
VA+VB
















+ (1− λ)[ VB
VA+VB
] > λ VB
VB+VC
































and holds for any
λ ∈ [0, 1).QED
Lemma 3 Let VA = VB + η > VC = 1, where η ∈ {−1, 0, 1}. Therefore, k2 −1 ≤ VA ≤
k
2
+1. Assume that η = 1 (the equivalent arguments holds for η = −1). In this case VA = k2
and the only winning coalition in which C participates is {A,C}. Thus, we are interested
in finding for which values of k the {A,C} coalition is also stable. Notice that {A,C} is





, that is, if A is a purely office-motivated party it would prefer to form a












utABC (B) as well. The
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latter inequality implies that even if party A is purely ideology motivated and even if it
dislikes the policy of party C the most (party A has preferences compatible with a tABC










































k−1 and since k is always a natural number, the later inequality
holds if and only if k > 7. We replicate this exercise for η = 0 and we also find that k > 7
is a sufficient condition for the existence of a stable coalition in which C participates.
The only difference of the η = 0 case compared to the cases in which η ∈ {−1, 1} is
that there are two winning coalitions in which C participates; {A,C} and {B,C}. Since
both A and B received exactly the same votes, party C will choose partner according
to its ideological preferences (or it will choose a partner randomly if it is purely office-
motivated) and k > 7 will guarantee that A (B) strictly prefers to be in a coalition with
C rather than with B (A). QED
Proposition 3 A BNE consists of strategies and beliefs. We will prove that if the
expected vote share of A is zero and the expected vote shares of the other two parties
are positive (formally, vA = 0, vB > 0 and vC > 0 such that vA + vB + vC = 1) then
a tABC will vote for B (equivalently one can show that a tACB voter will vote for C).
That is, we will show that beliefs {vA = 0, vB = p(tBAC) + p(tBCA) + p(tABC), vC =
p(tCAB) + p(tCBA) + p(tACB)} and the strategy profile which is consistent with these
beliefs form a BNE. We know that A′s ideological preferences should be given by one
of the strict orders {A  B  C} or {A  C  B} (assume without loss of generality
that A′s preferences are given by the first linear order). For large polities (n → ∞)
the probability that there exists a positive measure of voters with preferences that are
compatible with A′s ideological preferences converges to one. Let us investigate the
problem that a voter i with such preferences faces in this case. If she expects that
vA = 0, vB > 0 and vC > 0 then the only possibility that her vote can define the outcome
is when VˆB = VˆC + η where η ∈ {−1, 0, 1}. Notice that a) in such eventualities voting
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for C is always a strictly dominated strategy and b) η ∈ {−1, 1} implies that k is even
and η = 0 implies that k is odd. We detail below the possible pivotal eventualities.
I) If η = −1 then voter i gets utility −1
2
if she votes for B (because B and C will form
a coalition in which they will have equal weights). a) If k > 7 and our voter votes for A
then both coalitions {A,C} and {B,C} are stable. In this case the coalition {A,C} is
formed with probability 0 << ξ << 1 and the coalition {B,C} is formed with probability
1 − ξ. Voter i gets utility − VˆC−1
1+VˆC
if she votes for A and {A,C} is formed (because the





respectively) and utility strictly less than −1
2
if she votes for
A and {B,C} is formed. b) If k ≤ 7 voter i gets utility of, at most, equal to 0 when the
voter votes for A (and government {A,C} is formed if VˆA = 0, VˆB = 0, VˆC = 1).
II) If η = 0 then voter i gets utility 0 if she votes for B (because B will form a
single-party government) and if k > 7 voter i gets utility 1
1+VˆB
if she votes for A. This is
because the condition of Lemma 3 is satisfied and, thus, B will prefer to form a coalition
with A rather than with C. Due to ideological proximity with B, A will prefer to form a





respectively. If k ≤ 7 voter i gets utility of, at most, equal to 1 by voting
A (and a single-party government {A} is formed if VˆA = 0, VˆB = 0, VˆC = 0).
III) If η = 1 then voter i gets utility 0 if she votes for B (because B will form a
single-party government) and if k > 7 voter i gets utility 1
1+VˆB
if she votes for A. This is
because the condition of Lemma 3 is satisfied and, thus, B will prefer to form a coalition
with A rather than with C. Due to ideological proximity with B, A will prefer to form a





respectively. If k ≤ 7 voter i gets utility of, at most, equal to 1
2
by voting
A (and government {A,B} is formed if VˆA = 0, VˆB = 1, VˆC = 0).
Formally, voter i will vote for her second ranked candidate B if the following holds:
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prob(VˆB = VˆC − 1 and k > 7)[−1
2
− ξ(−E( VˆC − 1
1 + VˆC
|VˆB = VˆC − 1 and k > 7))− (1− ξ)(−1
2
)] +
+prob(VˆB = VˆC − 1 and k ≤ 7)[−1
2
− 0] +
+prob(VˆB = VˆC and k > 7)[0− E( 1
1 + VˆB
|VˆB = VˆC and k > 7)] +
+prob(VˆB = VˆC and k ≤ 7)[0− 1] +
+prob(VˆB = VˆC + 1 and k > 7)[0− E( 1
1 + VˆB
|VˆB = VˆC + 1 and k > 7)] +




prob(VˆB = VˆC − 1 and k ≤ 7) = prob(VˆB = VˆC − 1|k ≤ 7)× prob(k ≤ 7),
prob(VˆB = VˆC and k ≤ 7) = prob(VˆB = VˆC |k ≤ 7)× prob(k ≤ 7) and
prob(VˆB = VˆC + 1 and k ≤ 7) = prob(VˆB = VˆC + 1|k ≤ 7)× prob(k ≤ 7).
It is obvious that all prob(VˆB = VˆC − 1|k ≤ 7), prob(VˆB = VˆC |k ≤ 7) and prob(VˆB =
VˆC + 1|k ≤ 7) take a positive value significantly higher than 0. On the other side we have






Notice that prob(VˆB = VˆC − 1) = prob(VˆB = VˆC − 1 and k > 7) + prob(VˆB = VˆC − 1
and k ≤ 7) and prob(VˆB = VˆC − 1 and k ≤ 7) = prob(VˆB = VˆC − 1|k ≤ 7)× prob(k ≤ 7).
That is, 1 = prob(VˆB=VˆC−1 and k>7)
prob(VˆB=VˆC−1) + prob(VˆB = VˆC − 1|k ≤ 7)×
prob(k≤7)
prob(VˆB=VˆC−1) .








for n → ∞.
So it must be the case that for n → ∞, prob(k ≤ 7) becomes infinitely smaller than




































increases in a polynomial rate while
en(2
√
vBvC−vB−vC)+n increases in an exponential rate (n(2
√
vBvC − vB − vC) + n is always












vBvC−vB−vC )+n → 0 and therefore
prob(k≤7)




prob(VˆB = VˆC − 1|k ≤ 7) × 0 which is equivalent to prob(VˆB=VˆC−1 and k>7)prob(VˆB=VˆC−1) → 1 and to
prob(VˆB = VˆC − 1 and k > 7)→ prob(VˆB = VˆC − 1).
With the same logic we can demonstrate that prob(VˆB = VˆC and k > 7)→ prob(VˆB =
VˆC) and that prob(VˆB = VˆC + 1 and k > 7)→ prob(VˆB = VˆC + 1).
By this last observation and the offset theorem of Myerson (2000) we have that
prob(VˆB=VˆC and k>7)




and prob(VˆB=VˆC+1 and k>7)




All these imply that if we divide our relevant inequality with prob(VˆB = VˆC − 1 and
k > 7) we should get:
ξ[−1
2
− (−E( VˆC − 1
1 + VˆC
|VˆB = VˆC − 1 and k > 7))] +
+prob(VˆB = VˆC − 1|k ≤ 7) prob(k ≤ 7)










|VˆB = VˆC and k > 7)] +
+prob(VˆB = VˆC |k ≤ 7) prob(k ≤ 7)







|VˆB = VˆC + 1 and k > 7)] +
+prob(VˆB = VˆC |k ≤ 7) prob(k ≤ 7)











|VˆB = VˆC and k > 7)→ E( 11+VˆB |VˆB = VˆC + 1 and k > 7)→ 0
the above inequality becomes ξ
2
> 0 and always holds. That is, when vA = 0, vB > 0
and vC > 0 then a tABC will vote for B (equivalently a tACB voter will vote for C).
Therefore, beliefs {vA = 0, vB = p(tBAC) + p(tBCA) + p(tABC), vC = p(tCAB) + p(tCBA) +
p(tACB)} and the strategy profile which is consistent with these beliefs form a BNE. QED
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